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Abstract 
The picture often painted is that foreign capital inflows in China and India are 
prominently linked to rapid growth at the national level, and contribute to widening 
income disparities at the provincial/state level. In this paper we revisit Krugman’s 
(1993) contention that foreign capital can hardly be considered an important income 
growth driver, when in most developing countries it only accounts for a fractional 
share of gross capital formation. In the case of contemporary China and India, the 
data suggests that Krugman’s critique holds largely true, even in the coastal regions 
that are considered magnets for foreign investment. Thus, domestic factors, rather 
than the driving forces of globalization, appear to be the more important 
determinants of income growth in both countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, China and India have been amongst the world’s fastest growing 
economies. In 2003, both countries grew in real terms by 9 percent. At the same time, 
both countries have been leading recipients of high profile foreign capital flows. In 
the case of China, foreign capital has predominantly flowed into the manufacturing 
sector and is said by many to be transforming China into a ‘factory to the world’. In 
the case of India, it is foreign investment to the services sector, particularly IT 
services, that has been most prominent and an analogous tag has been used to describe 
India as an emerging ‘back office to the world’ (The Economist, 05/05/2001). With all 
the media attention devoted to foreign investment and rapid rates of income growth in 
both countries, it is unsurprising that the two variables are generally thought to be 
linked in a significant and causal manner (Venu, 2001; Secor, 2003).   
 
A striking feature of foreign investment in both China and India is that it is strongly 
concentrated in particular localities. As a result, in addition to being considered a 
driver of income growth at the national level, foreign capital flows are also thought to 
be foremost amongst those factors that explain widening income disparities within 
both countries (Fujita and Hu, 2001; Venu, 2001; Xing and Zhang, 2004). In China 
and India, foreign capital has flowed overwhelmingly to the coastal provinces/states. 
The reasons for this are several. Most obviously, these regions hold a natural 
locational advantage for engaging in foreign trade and are thus, attractive hosts for 
trade-orientated foreign direct investment (FDI). Greatly augmenting their locational 
advantage is the fact that historically these provinces/states have been the leading 
points of embarkation for Chinese and Indian labour migration abroad. With respect 
to China, it is no surprise then that facing rising production costs in places such as 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, overseas Chinese funded the mainland’s initial foreign 
investment boom and drew on their personal connections in the coastal regions to help 
negotiate their way through China’s underdeveloped legal and physical infrastructure 
(The Economist, 03/05/2005). China’s coastal provinces are also the richest in the 
country, and therefore desirable locations for domestic market-orientated foreign 
investment.  
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In the case of India, Srivastava and Sen (2003) and a recent International Monetary 
Fund report titled ‘India: Selected Issues’ cited in Srinivasan (2005), argue that apart 
from Delhi, five coastal states (two each in the southern and western regions of the 
country, and one in the eastern region), i.e. Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, 
Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh account for 60-70 percent of the total FDI inflows into 
India. These so-called high performing state economies (HPSEs), as baptized by 
Shand and Bhide (2001), have better infrastructure to connect with the surrounding 
states, a crucial factor that has helped them to be chosen as a center for the 
establishment of export processing zones (EPZs), and special economic zones (SEZs) 
for attracting export-oriented FDI. Regional FDI inflows into India have also been 
distinctly associated with a high degree of urbanization. For instance, all of the five 
coastal states mentioned above are quite highly urbanized, due to the presence of 
metropolitan cities like Bangalore, Chennai, Mumbai and Hyderabad (Srivastava & 
Sen, 2003). Thus, the stylized facts do indeed appear to point to globalization’s 
driving forces – labour migration, trade and investment – forming a virtuous circle 
that strongly drives income growth. If globalization’s driving forces do contribute 
prominently to income growth, particularly at the provincial/state level, this has broad 
economic and political implications. For example, spatial differences in income per 
capita drive internal labour migration, which in turn determines the strain that will be 
placed on a country’s infrastructure. At least in the case of China, the authorities have 
also repeatedly expressed concern over the effect that regional income inequalities 
could have on future political stability.  
 
In this paper we take a step back from the media hype surrounding foreign investment 
and economic growth in China and India, and even from many of the academic 
studies that report a statistically significant relationship between foreign investment 
and economic growth. Statistical significance is after all simply a comparison between 
an estimated coefficient and standard error. What really matters in terms of the impact 
on income growth is the size of the estimated coefficient. Our aim is a simple one – to 
consider the scale of foreign capital inflows vis-à-vis domestic capital as a source of 
gross capital formation. Our reflection on this issue is motivated by Krugman’s (1993) 
observation that foreign capital generally only contributes an extremely small amount 
to gross capital formation in developing countries. For Krugman then, to label foreign 
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capital as an important income growth driver was nonsensical. The basic data analysis 
undertaken in this paper shows that Krugman’s critique has much relevance in 
contemporary China and India. Domestic capital remains king, even in the coastal 
regions that are regarded as magnets for foreign investment. Domestic capital is also 
shown to be moving towards the same localities that attract the bulk of foreign capital 
inflows. To explain why the apparent marginal productivity of capital is higher in 
these areas than elsewhere, it is necessary to look beyond the driving forces of 
globalization and consider the impact that domestic factors have on income growth.  
 
2. QUALIFYING THE LINK BETWEEN FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS 
AND INCOME GROWTH 
In commenting on the popular view that foreign capital was an important driver of 
income growth in developing countries, Krugman (1993) contended that this was 
logically impossible when foreign capital only accounted for a fraction of gross 
capital formation in these countries (approximately 3 percent). He also added that he 
saw no good reason to expect this to change anytime soon. Levine (2001) took 
exception to Krugman’s argument based on the fact that foreign capital might 
primarily contribute to income growth through its contribution to technological 
change and total factor productivity growth, rather than capital accumulation per se. 
Others have pointed out that the level of foreign capital flowing into developing 
countries continued to rise during the second half of the 1990s. Yet neither of these 
retorts amount to a particularly effective rebuttal of Krugman’s basic argument. 
Firstly, even if the key contribution of foreign capital is to technological change, this 
effect will still be linked to its scale. Secondly, the notion that the impact of foreign 
capital inflows might somehow be magnified by technological spillover effects 
requires taking the view that foreign capital is special in this regard vis-à-vis domestic 
capital. We do not wish to go into this debate in detail in this paper but suffice to say 
the evidence on the spillover effects associated with foreign capital inflows are far 
from uniform (see Lipsey, 2003). Representing perhaps a more extreme view, Singh 
(2002) takes the position that foreign capital inflows are indeed special but more 
likely in a negative rather than positive way. Finally, as for the level of foreign capital 
inflows rising, this is not the key issue in terms of income growth. What matters is not 
the level of foreign capital inflows but their proportional significance.  
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In the 2000s, there can be little doubt that Krugman’s observation has largely been 
forgotten amidst the excitement surrounding the rising levels of foreign capital 
inflows in China and India, and the changes these flows are supposed to be making to 
the geography of global output composition. To assess whether Krugman’s critique 
has any relevance to contemporary China and India, Table 1 presents net inflows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and net inflows of non-FDI capital (non-FDI) (i.e., net 
inflows of portfolio investment + net inflows of debt) as a percentage of gross capital 
formation in both China and India. The chief reason to include the latter is the 
common complaint emanating from India that FDI comparisons between China and 
India are unfair, since India’s more sophisticated financial institutions and direct 
capital markets mean that foreign capital often enters the country in non-FDI form. 
Table 1 contains several points of interest. Firstly, the importance of foreign capital 
inflows in gross capital formation is greater in China than in India.  
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Table 1. Net foreign capital inflows as a percentage of gross capital formation 
(GCF) 
 China India 
 Net inflows 
of FDI  
(% GCF) 
Net inflows 
of non-FDI 
(% GCF) 
Net foreign 
capital 
inflows  
(% GCF) 
Net inflows 
of FDI  
(% GCF) 
Net inflows 
of non-FDI 
(% GCF) 
Net foreign 
capital 
inflows  
(% GCF) 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.4 
1.4 
1.7 
2.4 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
3.3 
7.4 
14.7 
15.1 
12.5 
0.0 
2.4 
0.8 
2.8 
3.0 
4.2 
4.6 
8.4 
6.4 
3.3 
6.7 
4.2 
9.9 
8.3 
6.5 
6.4 
0.1 
2.8 
1.4 
3.7 
4.5 
5.6 
6.3 
10.8 
9.3 
6.1 
9.5 
7.6 
17.3 
23.0 
21.6 
18.9 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.9 
1.3 
2.3 
9.7 
6.9 
12.6 
11.8 
8.2 
7.7 
7.7 
8.3 
11.5 
8.2 
7.9 
6.3 
8.5 
5.6 
9.8 
0.9 
9.9 
7.1 
12.7 
11.8 
8.2 
7.9 
7.9 
8.7 
11.6 
8.6 
8.2 
6.4 
9.0 
6.5 
11.1 
3.2 
1996 12.4 4.9 17.3 2.9 5.6 8.5 
1997 12.9 7.0 19.9 3.9 1.0 4.9 
1998 12.3 -3.8 8.5 3.0 2.8 5.7 
1999 10.4 -0.3 10.2 2.1 1.1 3.2 
2000 9.8 0.4 10.2 2.4 5.6 8.0 
2001 9.8 0.2 10.0 3.5 1.0 4.5 
2002 9.6 0.6 10.2 3.2 0.1 3.3 
2003 8.5 3.4 11.9 3.1 2.7 5.8 
Ave  80-03 
Ave  80-89 
Ave  90-99 
Ave  00-03 
 
6.5 
1.4 
10.4 
9.4 
3.8 
3.6 
5.0 
1.1 
10.3 
5.1 
15.4 
10.6 
1.3 
0.2 
1.7 
3.0 
6.3 
9.2 
4.9 
2.4 
7.6 
9.4 
6.7 
5.4 
Source – World Bank, World Development Indicators Database and Global Development Finance 
Database. 
 
A higher share in China has been particularly pronounced since the 1990. Secondly, 
FDI accounts for a larger proportion of foreign capital inflows in China compared 
with India. This may augment the impact that foreign capital has on income growth in 
China compared with India if one regards FDI as embodying favorable characteristics 
(such as more advanced technology) that are not found in debt and portfolio 
investment flows. Thirdly, while the importance of foreign capital in China and 
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India’s capital formation exceeds that of Krugman’s ‘average’ developing country, 
even in the case of China, it remains relatively modest averaging 10.3 percent of the 
entire period. The danger of too closely linking high rates of economic growth to 
foreign capital inflows is starkly illustrated by China’s experience during the 1980s. 
China began its economic reform program in 1979 and almost immediately the 
growth rate jumped to average nearly 10 percent during 1980s. Yet during the 1980s, 
foreign capital inflows accounted for just 5.1 percent of gross capital formation.  
Finally, it is interesting to consider the changing importance of foreign capital in each 
country over time. While the hype surrounding foreign capital inflows in both 
countries has become more fever-pitched during the 2000s, the contribution that these 
inflows have made to gross capital formation has actually fallen. In China, the 
contribution fell from 15.4 percent during the 1990s to 10.6 percent in the 2000s. A 
decline from the 1990s to the 2000s is also observable in the case of India although 
the drop is not as pronounced as in China. A major difference between the two 
countries on the other hand is how the importance of foreign capital changed after 
economic reform programs began. In China, while the importance of foreign capital 
declined in the 2000s compared with the 1990s, it remained significantly higher than 
in the early stages of the reform program during the 1980s. In India, foreign capital 
inflows actually contributed more significantly to gross capital formation before 
economic reforms began in 1991. During the 1980s, foreign capital inflows accounted 
for 9.4 percent of gross capital formation. In the 1990s this fell to 6.7 percent and in 
the 2000s to 5.4 percent. One feature that has positively responded to economic 
reform in India is the proportion of foreign capital inflows in the form of FDI. 
Nevertheless, with the importance of foreign capital inflows so marginal overall, it 
remains somewhat counter-intuitive to link recent high rates of income growth with 
foreign capital inflows.   
 
To assess whether foreign capital is relevant in explaining divergences in the spatial 
distribution of income within China and India, it is necessary to assemble 
provincial/state-level data. In Tables 2 and 3 we use sub-national level data from 
China and India to calculate in the case of China, the share of actually used foreign 
investment as a percentage of gross capital formation in each province, and with 
respect to India, the share of FDI approvals as a percentage of gross capital formation 
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in each of the major states. Two findings stand out. Firstly, in China foreign capital 
clearly contributes more significantly to gross capital formation in the coastal eastern 
provinces than in the central and western regions. Surprisingly however, in India, FDI 
contributes more extensively to gross capital formation in the middle-income states 
than in the high and low-income states. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
Indian central government to date has played a limited role in promoting the 
investment climates of the states. Rather, it is up to each state to try to attract more 
foreign investment. Secondly, in spite of its relative significance in some provinces 
compared with others, even in the case of the former, foreign capital does not come 
close to rivaling domestic capital in terms of its importance. On average, foreign 
capital only accounts for 12.4 percent of gross capital formation in the eastern 
provinces of China and 9.6 percent in the middle-income states of India. Admittedly 
though, there is considerable variation amongst the Chinese eastern provinces and 
middle-income Indian states. In Guangdong province in China, for example, the share 
of foreign capital reaches nearly one quarter. Nonetheless, on the whole it would be 
difficult to construct the argument that foreign capital flows are a key factor driving 
income growth at both the national and provincial/state levels in China and India. 
 
Table 2. Foreign investment in China as a percentage of gross capital formation, 
average 2001-2003 
Eastern provinces Central provinces Western provinces 
Beijing 7.8 Anhui 2.0 Chongqing 2.0 
Fujian 19.2 Heilongjiang 2.3 Gansu 0.9 
Guangdong 23.9 Henan 1.5 Guizhou 0.5 
Guangxi 3.8 Hubei 6.6 Ningxia 0.6 
Hainan 13.9 Hunan 4.8 Qinghai 1.3 
Hebei 2.5 Inner Mongolia 1.2 Shaanxi 2.5 
Jiangsu 17.3 Jiangxi 5.2 Sichuan 2.2 
Lioning 12.7 Jilin 2.4 Tibet N/a 
Shandong 10.2 Shanxi 1.9 Yunnan 0.7 
Shanghai 12.7   Xinjiang 0.2 
Tianjin 13.6     
Zhejiang 11.5     
Average 12.4  3.1  1.2 
Source – China Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 3. Foreign investment approvals in India as a percentage of gross capital 
formation, average 1991-2001 
High-income states Middle-income states Low-income states 
Punjab 3.1 Kerala 1.9 Bihar 1.2 
Gujarat 8.2 Andhra Pradesh 9.4 Rajasthan 2.8 
Maharashtra 12.4 Karnataka 14.2 Uttar Pradesh 2.0 
Haryana 4.8 Tamil Nadu 13.1 Madhya Pradesh 1.9 
Delhi N/a West Bengal 9.5 Orissa 14.1 
    Assam N/a 
Average 7.1  9.6  4.4 
Source – Lakhchaura (2004) and Singh and Srinivasan (2004). 
 
Endogeneity issues generally infect the reliability of econometric studies that consider 
the impact of foreign capital inflows on income growth. In the case of China, Zhang 
and Zhang (2003) is perhaps the most instructive econometric study to emerge to date 
and at least attempted to take the endogeneity issue into account. Using provincial 
level data, they find in common with most previous studies that there exists a 
statistically significant relationship between the foreign capital stock and labour 
productivity. However, the more telling feature of their study in terms of the impact 
on income growth was the fact that the size of the estimated coefficient associated 
with the domestic capital stock was 15 times larger than that associated with the 
foreign capital stock. Such results follow logically from the flow FDI data presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Zhang and Zhang (2003) also draw on their econometric findings to 
explain the contributions that the domestic capital stock and the foreign capital stock 
(along with other variables) made to observed divergences in spatial income 
inequalities between 1986-1998. They conclude that the contribution of the domestic 
capital stock was 75.1 percent, compared with just 11.1 percent for the foreign capital 
stock.  
 
Amongst India’s states, Maharashtra has been by far and away the standout performer 
in terms of attracting FDI, attracting more than double that of its closest rivals, Tamil 
Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat, Delhi and Andhra Pradesh. Yet even for Maharashtra, 
between 1991-2001, FDI only accounted for 12.4 percent of the state’s gross fixed 
capital formation. The fractional share of foreign investment in gross capital 
formation across Indian states helps to explain why some states can be relatively rich 
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while capturing only a fraction of the national foreign investment total. Punjab, 
Haryana, Kerala and West Bengal, for example, are considered to be middle to high-
income states, yet collectively they only account for 5.9 percent of national FDI 
approvals (Mahendra Dev, 2004). Foreign investment, in aggregate, simply does not 
matter much. The above numbers also mean that the results of econometric studies by 
Dua and Rashid (1998), and Chakraborty and Basu (2002) who report no statistically 
detectible, causal relationship running from FDI to economic activity in the case of 
India are unsurprising.  
 
Another feature of the data is that it shows domestic capital in China and India also 
moves to particular localities. Table 4 shows that gross capital formation per capita in 
China’s eastern provinces in 2003 was more than twice that in the central and western 
provinces. This was in spite of the central government’s ‘Go West’ campaign, which 
sought to reallocate domestic capital toward the inland regions through budgetary 
means and directed credit, as well as through establishing a host of incentives to lure 
foreign capital. Table 5 also demonstrates a similar trend with regards to India, with 
the high-income states in 2000 accumulating gross capital formation per capita that is 
almost double that of the middle-income states, and more than 3 times the amount in 
the low-income states. The fact that both domestic and foreign capital moves to the 
same localities strongly suggests that the marginal productivity of capital in these 
regions is higher than elsewhere. Given its limited scale, and the theoretical ambiguity 
surrounding the broader productivity impact that foreign capital inflows might have, 
in the following section we argue the need to look elsewhere to explain these spatial 
divergences in capital productivity.  
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Table 4. Gross capital formation (RMB) per capita, 2003 
Eastern provinces Central provinces Western provinces 
Beijing 15,751 Anhui 2,270 Chongqing 4,199 
Fujian 6,872 Heilongjiang 3,428 Gansu 2,346 
Guangdong 6,612 Henan 2,974 Guizhou 1,963 
Guangxi 2,121 Hubei 3,569 Ningxia 5,522 
Hainan 3,895 Hunan 2,609 Qinghai 5,512 
Hebei 4,622 Inner Mongolia 5,460 Shaanxi 3,712 
Jiangsu 8,348 Jiangxi 3,185 Sichuan 2,638 
Lioning 5,543 Jilin 4,079 Tibet 3,871 
Shandong 6,344 Shanxi 3,712 Yunnan 2,622 
Shanghai 17,283   Xinjiang 5,787 
Tianjin 13,057     
Zhejiang 9,913     
Average 8,363  3,477  3,817 
Source – China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Table 5. Gross capital formation (Rs.) per capita, 2000 
High-income states Middle-income states Low-income states 
Punjab 4,130 Kerala 4,056 Bihar 1,439 
Gujarat 8,179 Andhra Pradesh 3,437 Uttar Pradesh 2,250 
Maharashtra 6,454 Karnataka 5,363 Madhya Pradesh 3,506 
Haryana 6,203 Tamil Nadu 4,821 Rajasthan 3,085 
Delhi 7,616 West Bengal 1,635 Orissa 1,783 
    Assam 899 
Average 6,516  3,862  2,160 
Source – Lakhchaura (2004) and Singh and Srinivasan (2004). 
 
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The purpose of this paper was a simple one – to take a step back from the 
conventional wisdom that closely links foreign investment and income and consider 
the scale of foreign capital inflows vis-à-vis domestic capital as a source of gross 
capital formation.  This reflection was motivated by Krugman’s (1993) critique that 
foreign capital is generally unimportant as a source of capital formation in developing 
countries. Despite the high profile accorded to China and India as hosts of foreign 
investment, we find that foreign capital inflows usually only equate to a small share of 
gross capital formation in both countries. We do not mean to suggest that foreign 
capital inflows are somehow irrelevant. To the extent that foreign capital supports a 
faster rate of capital accumulation and / or exhibits spillover effects over and above 
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those associated with domestic capital, then national and regional income growth rates 
will be impacted upon. Our point is simply that the scale of foreign capital inflows 
remains fundamental in determining its impact on income growth and correlation and 
statistical significance need not imply causality or a sizeable real world impact.  
 
For us, a particularly important stylized fact that requires explanation is the apparently 
large regional variations in the marginal productivity of capital within both China and 
India. We leave providing a detailed commentary on the reasons for such spatial 
variations to others but the limited proportional significance of foreign capital inflows 
in gross capital formation leads us to conclude the chief answer is unlikely to lie here. 
There is good reason to speculate that the importance of trade to the regional economy 
is a far more important factor. The static and dynamic gains from trade are well 
known and trade does account for a large share of regional GDP in China and India’s 
coastal provinces. For example, in China in Guangdong province and the municipality 
of Shanghai, trade accounted for 190 and 150 percent of GDP respectively in 2003. 
There is of course interplay between foreign capital and trade. In China, companies 
with some foreign funding now account for more than 50 percent of the country’s 
total exports. We speculate that it is through this indirect channel that foreign capital 
inflows may have their largest impact on income growth. Yet even the trade-FDI 
nexus needs to be treated carefully. It is, for example, often unappreciated that the 
majority of FDI moving into China is in fact orientated towards supplying the 
domestic market. Buckley and Meng (2005) show this holds true even in the case of 
the manufacturing sector, which is the nation’s star export performer, accounting for 
92 percent of China’s total exports in 2003.  
 
Beyond trade, a host of domestic factors strike us as being far more relevant than the 
driving forces of globalization. In the case of China, one key issue is deficiencies 
associated with the fiscal system in performing its redistributive function, which 
impacts on the provision of physical infrastructure and human capital development at 
the local level (OECD, 2004). There are also question marks over the relative 
efficiency of local government institutions (an issue encountered in India as well), and 
the impact of central government policies that favour some regions over others 
(Brown, et al., 2005). China’s domestic market also remains quite fragmented with 
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wide-ranging differences in the degree of marketisation between the provinces (Fan, 
et al., 2001). In India’s case, low quality infrastructure remains the main concern, with 
infrastructure in most states in need of considerable upgrading. Other factors include 
the absence of jointly coordinated policies by both the central and state governments 
towards enhancing the productivity of capital, an inflexible labour market due to 
stringent labour laws, limited scale of export processing zones, corruption, and the 
significant burden of bureaucratic red tape and regulation (Rao, 2004; Srinivasan, 
2005). Given the practical conundrums that spatial variations in income growth 
engender, it is a matter of importance that research and policy attention is focused on 
key issues. The analysis undertaken in this paper suggests it would be wise not to 
become overly fixated on the impact of globalization.  
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